Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory. What if acquiring these results in the first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of this assumption, and the unfolding language game leads us to contextual and probabilistic theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement becomes problematic if one tries to commensurate the interaction assumption with the notion of a spectator theory. The measurement "problem" is, thus, the collision of different epistemologic stances.
I. INTRODUCTION
The infamous Wigner's-friend experiment [1] [2] [3] serves to illustrate the measurement problem [4, 5] : If we imagine Wigner performing a measurement on his friend who measured another system, there are different-in fact, incommensurable-uses of the term "measurement:" (M1) If the friend's "measurement" of a state in an equal superposition with respect to his measurement basis is regarded as an interaction between two systems-modelled by a physical evolution-, then it corresponds to a unitary on the joint system, yielding an entangled joint state;
(M2) if the "measurement" leads to exclusively one of several possible outcomes, and, thus, allows to judge the validity of a theory.
Statements (M1) and (M2) conflict as follows: The linearity of quantum mechanics cannot be reconciled with value-definiteness-i.e., the outcome being exclusively one of several possibilities. The incommensurability is not so much a peculiarityor defect-of quantum mechanics. Instead, we argue that it appears in theories that (a) account for interactions so that they are empirically significant, (b) require that an observation necessarily goes with such an interaction, (c) are falsifiable, and (d) in which experimental results have a minimal stability. The first two requirements render an observation itself empirically traceable. They are combined in the interaction assumption:
(IntA) Interactions are empirically traceable. An observation necessitates such an interaction.
The last requirement (d) is a generalization of Popper's characterization of physics being concerned with reproducible effects 1 to the demand that asking the same ques-1 "Indeed the scientifically significant physical effect may be defined as that which can be regularly reproduced by anyone who carries out the appropriate experiment in the way prescribed." [6, §I.8, emphasis in original] tion twice will yield the same answer:
(ISys) There exist conditions under which two equivalent, subsequent measurements performed on the same system yield the same answer. These conditions are independent of the questions asked.
A system satisfying these conditions will be called isolated.
II. DESCRIBING SYSTEMS
We discuss how to abstractly represent measurements in light of falsifiability and (ISys). We follow the path of quantum logic [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] -without actually referring to quantum mechanics-, and rely on notions of ordered sets and lattices as briefly summarized in the Appendix. Along the way, we put the program into a new perspective.
We think of a measurement as an inquiry about a binary question, i.e., about a question with two possible answers t and f. The binary questions are represented by elements in a set Q. By the requirement (ISys), there exists an equivalence relation on Q, such that under appropriate conditions, two equivalent questions α ∼ β with α, β ∈ Q yield equal answers. Let us denote by Q the corresponding set of equivalence classes. To ensure falsifiability [13] , we assume that for any equivalence class a ∈ Q, there exists a unique complementary class ¬a ∈ Q such that an inquiry about any question in a yields t if and only if an inquiry about any question in ¬a yields f. 2 We assume that the elements in Q allow for a partial temporal order: If a measurement corresponding to α is performed before another one β, then α < t β. The conditional on Q, i.e., α → β, is defined as follows:
If the inquiry about α yields t, then a subsequent inquiry about β > t α yields t.
The conditional on Q induces an order relation on the set of equivalence classes, a < b for a, b ∈ Q, if verifying the order relation does not break the equivalence: If we inquire about consecutive questions
then we assume to still obtain equal answers for α and α ′ , as well as for β and β ′ . Thus, we demand that the sublattice generated by {a, ¬a, b, ¬b} is distributive if a < b. If there exist elements 0 and 1 such that a ∧ ¬a = 0 and a ∨ ¬a = 1 for all a ∈ Q, then the above sublattice requirement renders the complement defined above order-reversing and leaves us with an orthocomplemented lattice of classes of equivalent questions (Q, <). 3 To ensure the distributivity of the sublattice defined above, we require the lattice to be orthomodular, i.e., to satisfy the following:
III. INTERACTING SYSTEMS
We now turn to the question how to ensure the interaction assumption (IntA). An obvious way to trace interactions is to "ask the system whether it interacted." This assumes the existence of a corresponding equivalence class q int ∈ Q. If we inquire consecutively about α < t σ with σ ∈ q int , then we expect σ ′ to yield t independent of the result of the inquiry about α. This should also hold for ¬α. It follows that q int > α ∨ ¬α, and, therefore, q int = 1. Thus, the interaction assumption cannot be realized by a single inquiry about questions in a special equivalence class in Q.
Yet, we can establish within Q whether an interaction occurred by how questions relate to one another. In particular, if we aim to position the characteristic "having interacted" dichotomously to "being isolated" as described in (ISys), then the former characteristic is expected to be relational as is the latter. Following this path, we demand that equivalent questions σ, σ ′ ∈ q int inquired about before and after an interaction corresponding to an inquiry about a questions α ∈ a with σ < t α < t σ ′ do not necessarily yield the same answer independent of
what the result of the inquiry about α is. For the equivalence classes this entails 4
That is, q int is incompatible with a. Equivalently, the sublattice generated by q int and a is not distributive (see Appendix VII). As compatibility in an orthomodular lattice is symmetric, the interaction corresponding to inquiries about questions in q int can be traced inversely with inquiries about questions in a.
To ensure that all elements in Q correspond to traceable interactions, we require that in the orthomodular lattice Q, the sublattice Z of elements compatible with all other elements in the lattice, called the center, contains merely 1 and 0. The requirement for Q to form an orthomodular lattice with trivial center is sufficient to satisfy the interaction assumption. Subsequently, we turn to the question whether it is necessary.
A. Assigning probabilities
The above discussion is inspired by quantum mechanics: 5 The set of orthogonal projectors on a Hilbert space P(H) forms an atomic, orthomodular lattice with the order relation
Gleason's theorem [14] establishes a one-to-one correspondence between probability distributions over P(H) and density matrices if dim H ≥ 3. With projectors forming equivalence classes along a real time parameter, Q qm = P(H) × R , and Q qm = P(H) , quantum mechanics carries the lattice structure before assigning probabilities. A priori, the lattice structure of Q is not evident: A theory does not primarily make statements about the relation α → β.
More generally, theories yield probability distributions for time-ordered sequences of questions, 6 i.e.,
where neither Q has a pre-established conditional, nor Q a natural lattice structure. Then, the requirement (ISys) that consecutive equivalent questions Let us consider the possibility that the probability derives from a unary function
such that µ(α) is the probability for the answer to α is t. From the above formulation of (ISys), it follows that
which is the case if and only if µ(α) = µ(β) = 0 or µ(α) = µ(β) = 1. Thus, the function µ : Q → {0, 1} takes merely two values, and is constant within an equivalence class a ∈ Q. Therefore, there is an induced function µ ′ : Q → {0, 1}. An immediate consequence is that if the question q int from above is an element Q, then inquiring about the question "whether the system interacted" yields either always t or always f, independently of inquiries about any other question. This is a contradiction with (IntA). A theory satisfying both (IntA) and (ISys) cannot allow for an assignment of probabilities to elements in Q independent of inquiries about other, nonequivalent questions: The theory is contextual [15, 16] .
To ensure a minimal detectability of inquiries and their corresponding interactions, we are lead to assume the following, similar to Heisenberg uncertainty: For any α ∈ Q there exist equivalent
To connect this back to the lattice formalism, we ask: Does a contextual theory satisfying (ISys) and (IntA) give rise to an orthomodular lattice on Q? Employing the contextuality, we define the order relation a < b by P((β, t) | (α, t)) = 1 ∀α ∈ a, β ∈ b , and
and the complement ¬a by
Assuming falsifiability, we demand that the complement exists and is unique. While this yields a complemented and weakly modular poset, it is not clear whether it also constitutes an orthomodular lattice. For the remainder of this text, we assume that Q forms an orthomodular lattice.
The converse of the above consideration is: What probability distributions can be assigned to an orthomodular lattice? Let us assume that Q forms such a lattice and that µ ′ : Q → [0, 1] is a function that satisfies
If we impose (ISys), then, with the same reasoning as above, µ ′ is a dispersion-free state [17] . From Theorem I in [17] and Theorem 1 in [18] , it follows that if there exists a dispersion-free state on Q then the center Z is not trivial. Therefore, if we require (IntA) and (ISys), then any assignment of probabilities to elements in Q must be contextual.
IV. ISOLATED SYSTEMS
After the discussion in Section III, we are now able to explicate the notion of an isolated system consistent with the two assumptions (ISys) and (IntA): A system is isolated if and only if inquiries about any two equivalent questions α ∼ β, α, β ∈ Q yield equal answers with certainty.
To empirically verify whether a system is isolatedat least for the time between two inquiries-, one inquires about any two equivalent questions and compares the thus obtained answers. If the answers differ, then the inquiries detect an intermediate inquiry about a noncompatible question, and the system is not isolated. The equality of the answers is, however, not sufficient for the system to be isolated.
This empirical test is an essential ingredient in a keydistribution protocol like [19] .
V. INTERACTIONS WITHIN A JOINT SYSTEM
We now turn to interactions within an isolated system, i.e., between different parts of a joint system. Two systems, S 1 and S 2 , together can again be regarded as one system assuming that the ability to refer to S 1 and S 2 suffices to refer to the corresponding combined system. The joint system consisting of S 1 and S 2 is denoted S 1 × S 2 .
In [8] , Piron shows that an orthomodular lattice has a trivial center if and only if it is irreducible, i.e., the lattice cannot be written as a direct union, defined as follows: The direct product of orthocomplemented lattices L i with i ∈ I, forms another orthocomplemented lattice L p with the order relation
x > y, x, y ∈ L p ⇔ x i > y i ∀i ∈ I and the orthocomplementation ¬x = (¬x 1 , . . . , ¬x i , . . .) .
It follows from (IntA) that the lattice Q c cannot be the direct product of lattices Q 1 and Q 2 .
We imagine S 2 to be a friendly experimenter measuring S 1 , inspired by the Wigner's-friend experiment [1] [2] [3] . Let us, for now, merely consider S 1 : Before and after our friend inquires about a non-trivial α ∈ Q 1 we inquire about two equivalent α ′ ∼ α ′′ that belong to an equivalence class incompatible to the one represented by α.
The joint system S 1 × S 2 is however isolated. Thus, the equivalence classes of the joint system are not induced by the subsystems if they interact:
The friend's inquiry about a non-trivial α ∈ a ∈ Q 1 is characterized as follows:
A measurement effects an implication that reaches across systems. It is a case not accounted for in a product lattice. In particular, the measurement establishes the equivalence between (σ, α 1 ) and (β, α 2 ) in Q c while σ and β might not be equivalent in Q 2 . Let us denote m ∈ Q the equivalence class of (σ, α 1 and (β, α 2 ). The characterizations also implies: (a, 1) and (a, 0) are equivalence classes in Q c with (a, 0) < m < (a, 1). In particular, the equivalence class n ∈ Q c represented by (σ, α ′ 1 ) is incompatible with (a, 0) and (a, 1) if a ′ ∈ Q 1 is incompatible with a ∈ Q 1 . Therefore, also n and m are incompatible.
To empirically test whether the two subsystems S 1 and S 2 interact with one another, one empirically tests the equivalence relation on Q c by inquiring about questions in the same equivalence class and verifying that their answers match (see Section IV). Imagine, we initially inquired about a question in n. To verify that S c is isolated, and, thus, the two subsystems interacted, we inquire about a later element in n. By the incompatibility of n and (a, 1), we cannot at the same time empirically test whether the system interacted, and know about the result of the measurement.
We encounter the measurement problem: We cannot meaningfully-i.e., with the suitable empirical supportspeak of the measurement as an interaction between two systems, while maintaining the idea of the measurement yielding definite results.
VI. THE EPISTEMIC IMPORT: SPECTATOR THEORIES
The measurement problem unfolds if we compromise the Interaction Assumption (IntA) in order to save the measurement and its result from contextual dependences. Thus, the measurement problem exposes the idea that we can read off measurement results without effects for the measured system-the idea of a spectator theory.
The theory of knowing is modelled after what was supposed to take place in the act of vision. The object refracts light to the eye and is seen; it makes a difference to the eye and to the person having an optical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The real object is the object so fixed in its regal aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of knowledge is the inevitable outcome. [20, §1, p.26] The quest for certain measurement results is an epistemic problem: If knowledge is scientific knowledge and science is natural science, then the anchor of our knowledge is observation and measurement. And if knowledge must be constituted of certainties, then these observations cannot carry contextual dependences. 7 For Dewey in his pragmatic critique of absolute knowledge, quantum mechanics promises to get the natural sciences back on the path instituted by Galileo: The path of a dissolution of the distinction between immutable absolute knowledge and practical activity guided by belief.
The work of Galileo was not a development, but a revolution. It marked a change from a qualitative to the quantitative or metric; from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to relations; from aesthetic harmonies to mathematical formulae; from contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control; from rest to change; from eternal objects to temporal sequence. The idea of a two-realm scheme persisted for moral and religious purposes; it vanished for purposes of natural science. [20, §4, p.92] For Dewey, Heisenberg uncertainty was less of a problem for maintaining physics as a spectator theory, but rather a door opener towards overcoming the idea itself.
The element of indeterminateness is not connected with defect in the method of observation, but is instrinsic. The particle observed does not have fixed position or velocity, for it is changing all the time because of interaction: specifically, in this case, interaction with the act of observing, or more strictly, with the conditions under which an observation is possible; for it is not the 'mental' phase of observation which makes the difference. Since either position or velocity may be fixed at choice, leaving the element of indeterminacy on the other side, both of them are shown to be conceptual in nature. That is, they belong to our intellectual apparatus for dealing with antecedent existence, not to fixed properties of that existence. An isolation of a particle for measurement is essentially a device for regulation of subsequent perceptual experience. [20, §8, p.194 , emphasis in original]
The "intrinsic element of indeterminateness" is taken as an indicator for the participatory and practical elements of knowing.
The change [that Heisenberg uncertainty calls for] for the underlying philosophy and logic of science is, however, very great. In relation to the metaphysics of the Newtonian system it is hardly less than revolutionary. What is known is seen to be a product in which the act of observation plays a necessary rôle. Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known. Moreover, the metaphysics of existence as something fixed and therefore capable of literally exact mathematical description and prediction is undermined. Knowing is, for philosophical theory, a case of specially directed activity instead of something isolated from practice. The quest for certainty by means of exact possession in mind of immutable reality is exchanged for search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events. Intelligence in operation, another name for method, becomes the thing most worth winning. The principle of indeterminacy. It marks the acknowledgment, within scientific procedure itself, of the fact that knowing is one kind of interaction which goes on within the world. [20, §8, p.195f] Dewey, expecting the eye-opening effects of quantum mechanics, disregards his own, earlier concern about the Galilean revolution: But-and this 'but' is of fundamental importance-in spite of the revolution, the old conceptions of knowledge as related to an antecedent reality and of moral regulation as derived from properties of this reality, persisted. [20, §4, p.92] The idea of immutable knowledge did not only survive the Galilean but also the quantum revolution. It merely changed what could be absolutely known. With a theory that satisfies (IntA) and (ISys), we cannot expect to know answers to all questions that a system can be inquired about. But we can still hope for either some properties to be more fundamental than others-the Bohmian way out of the problem-or for the theory to expose the real structure of the world-the Everettian, or Parallel Lives, way out of the problem. In both cases, there remains a real and absolute element antecedent to any act of knowing that can be known at least "in principle." 8 This saves an essential aspect of spectator theories, namely, the positivist idea that we can gain access to something that is independent of our act of knowing.
If, however, the measurement problem reminds us that "Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known." [20, §8, p.195 ] 9 -just as antecedent "meaning" is a myth [22] -, then we are led to a very different reflection [27] . Following Habermas, we are in fact led to unwind the positivist removal of reflection. 10 The idea that cognition must be scientific cognition can be understood as a belief that we have put into the scientific act of knowing, and not something that the world imposes on us. 11 The measurement "problem" opens the door for reflection, for imagining a new way of looking at science and doing physics [28] .
VII. CONCLUSION
The requirement that there are isolated systems for which inquiries about equivalent questions yield equal answers combined with the requirement of traceable interactions leads to contextual and probabilistic theories. A characterization of a measurement as an interaction between two systems leads to a measurement problem: We cannot meaningfully-i.e., with the suitable empirical supportspeak of the measurement as an interaction between two systems, while maintaining the idea of the measurement yielding definite results. As such the measurement problem exposes an incompatibility between epistemological stances: The idea that knowledge is constituted of absolute certainties entails a spectator theory. A spectator theory, does, however, preclude empirical evidence for interactions during measurements, i.e., for evidence that our knowledge has support from outside of us, support from our contact with the world around us.
The incompatibility turns into a tension within positivism: The idea of an external source for our knowledge conflicts with the adherence to a spectator theory needed to ensure absolute knowledge.
(c) In an orthocomplemented lattice L, two elements a, b are orthogonal, denoted a ⊥ b, if a < ¬b, or, equivalently, b < ¬a-using the order reversing property of the ortho-complementation.
(d) An orthocomplemented lattice L is orthomodular if it satisfies weak modularity, i.e., for all a < b:
or, equivalently, if a > b: 
The proof consists of combining Theorem (2.15) and (2.17) in [8] .
Proof. If the sublattice is distributive, then
It remains to show that (2) is sufficient. First we show that compatibility is symmetric:
As a > (a ∧ b), we employ orthomodularity,
which proves the symmetry of compatibility. Further, we have to show equalities of the form
Note, first, that in any lattice a ∧ b < b and, therefore,
.
Applying orthomodularity, i.e., c 2 ∧(¬c 2 ∨c 1 ) = c 1 , yields
and, thus, we obtain (3).
Note the important role of weak modularity in the proof above.
Theorem 2 (Compatibility II). In an orthomodular lattice L, a is compatible with b if and only if there exists mutually orthogonal elements a ′ , b ′ , c ∈ L such that
Proof. If a and b are compatible, then
and thus we can set
which yields the orthogonal elements. If, inversely, a and b can be expressed in the above form, then
using weak modularity. Furthermore,
using weak modularity again, and, thus, with
we obtain a ∧ b = c. This yields 2.
Theorem 3 (Existence of dispersion-free states). On an orthomodular lattice L, there exists a dispersion-free state if and only if there exists an atom in the center of the lattice.
We follow the proof of Theorem I in [17] and the proof of Theorem 1 in [18] .
Proof. We first show that the existence of a dispersionfree state µ implies that there is an element in the center of L different from 0 and 1. Let L µ := {a ∈ L | µ(a) = 1}. Note that L µ = ∅. For any totally ordered subset T of L µ , the element a 0 = ∧{a ∈ T } ∈ L µ by the properties of a dispersion-free state. Thus, with Zorn's Lemma, L µ has a minimal element a m .
Let us now show that a m ≤ a ∀a ∈ L µ : If a 1 ∈ L µ , then there must exist an a 2 = 0 with a 2 < a m . Otherwise a m ∧ a 1 = 0 which contradicts the requirement of a dispersionfree state. By weak modularity and Theorem 1, there exist an b ∈ L orthogonal to a 2 such that a 2 ∨ b = a m .
If µ(a 2 ) = 0, then µ(b) = 1 and, thus, b ∈ L µ and b < a m , thus, b = a m . But then, a 2 = 0 and we obtain a contradiction, and we conclude that µ(a 2 ) = 1. This yields, again, a 2 = a m , and then a m < a 1 .
We now show that a m lies in the center of L: For any b ∈ L µ , a m < b and the two commute by weak modularity. If b / ∈ L µ , then with µ(b) + µ(¬b) = µ(b ∨ ¬b) = µ(1) = 1 it follows ¬b ∈ L µ . Thus, a m < ¬b and, therefore, a m is compatible with ¬b and thus with b. Now, we show that a m is an atom in L, i.e., ∀b ∈ L, b < a m either b = a m or b = 0. It suffices to show that if b / ∈ L, b < a then b = 0: In this case, ¬b ∈ L µ , and ¬b > a m > b. Therefore, b ∧ b < b ∧ ¬b = 0.
It remains to construct a dispersion-free state from an atom a in the center of L: Let µ(a) = 1. Any b ∈ L commutes with a, and thus a ∧ b exists and a ∧ b < a.
Since a is an atom, either a ∧ b = 0 and, therefore, b = 0 and µ(b) = 0, or a ∧ b = a. In the latter case, a < b and µ(b) = 1. Thus, µ is dispersion-free.
Lemma 1 (Incompatible elements). If a < b and a are not compatible with c for some a, b, c ∈ L, then also b and c are incompatible.
Proof. We have to show: If a < b and b is compatible with c, then also a is compatible with c. Let us consider a ∧ ¬c = a ∧ ¬c ′ ∧ ¬d
and thus (a ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ ¬c) = (a ∧ c) ∨ a = a .
